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ABSTRACT 
Risk analysis in seaports plays an increasingly important role in ensuring port operation 
reliability, maritime transportation safety and supply chain distribution resilience. However, 
the task is not straightforward given the challenges, including that port safety is affected by 
multiple factors related to design, installation, operation and maintenance and that 
traditional risk assessment methods such as quantitative risk analysis cannot sufficiently 
address uncertainty in failure data. This paper develops an advanced Failure Mode and 
Effects Analysis (FMEA) approach through incorporating Fuzzy Rule-Based Bayesian 
Networks (FRBN) to evaluate the criticality of the hazardous events (HEs) in a container 
terminal. The rational use of the Degrees of Belief (DoB) in a fuzzy rule base (FRB) 
facilitates the implementation of the new method in Container Terminal Risk Evaluation 
(CTRE) in practice. Compared to conventional FMEA methods, the new approach 
integrates FRB and BN in a complementary manner, in which the former provides a 
realistic and flexible way to describe input failure information while the latter allows easy 
updating of risk estimation results and facilitates real time safety evaluation and dynamic 
risk-based decision support in container terminals. The proposed approach can also be 
tailored for wider application in other engineering and management systems, especially 
when instant risk ranking is required by the stakeholders to measure, predict, and improve 
their system safety and reliability performance. 
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1. Introduction 
A careful literature review has disclosed that safety persistently occupies a backseat role 
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within port research, being overwhelmed by other aspects involving efficiency evaluation 
(Wu and Goh 2010; Demirel et al., 2012), port competition (Lam and Yap, 2011a), 
geographical analysis and regional port development (Notteboom and Rodrigue, 2005; Lee 
and Cullinane, 2005; Lam and Yap, 2011b), port policy and port governance (Brooks and 
Cullinane, 2007; Wang et al., 2012). Among the studies addressing port safety, many 
focused on policy issues based on descriptive or qualitative approaches, which together 
with the above challenge, critically points out the need for developing a robust and 
efficient quantitative risk analysis approach in order to prioritize hazards in ports (Yang et 
al., 2014). Furthermore, significant academic effort is devoted to port centric logistics, 
maritime logistics, and port operational optimization (e.g., Liu et al., 2002; Vis et al., 
2002; Steenken et al., 2004; Güntheret et al., 2006; Song and Lee, 2009) however, there 
are relatively few studies on port safety and risk (Darbra and Casal, 2004; Yang et al., 
2010; Mabrouki et al., 2014; Yang et al., 2010), revealing a research gap to be fulfilled. 
Safety analysis in a broad scope can be defined as the study of the consequences of system 
failures in relation to possible harm to people and/or damage to the environment or 
property including financial assets (HSE, 2001).  
 
In addition, a review of 984 papers published in  Maritime Policy & Management (MPM) 
by Notteboom et al. (2013) reveals that a core theme in seaport studies over the past 40 
years of its existence discloses that research in ports has evolved its research frameworks 
and techniques in many fields such as geography, econometrics, welfare economics, 
operations research, logistics/supply chain management and strategic management. In the 
last five years the themes of ports in transport and supply chains, port governance and port 
competition and competitiveness were dominating port research. On the other hand, in the 
first two decades of MPM, regulatory issues referring to competition, pricing, financing, 
environmental, safety and security related policy practices were research themes attracting 
much attention. Since then, port terminals including container terminals have been 
developed rabidly and aggressively, creating a growing interest in examining the prospects 
and limits of safety aspects in such growth and complex activities in port operations.  
However, the research on safety and security analysis of container terminal operations in a 
quantitative way has not yet been well conducted but the issue has been recently raised in 
Yang et al., (2014). If the risk result cannot be quantified, it may  well not motivate the 
industrial stakeholders to take control measures confidently. 
 
Traditional quantitative risk analysis methods such as Failure Mode and Effects Analysis 
(FMEA) can be used to identify the hazards of high risks. However, a careful literature 
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review reveals that a high level of uncertainty in data exists in port risk analysis, for which 
novel flexible risk approaches are needed. New methods based on uncertainty treatment 
theories such as fuzzy set modelling, Dempster-Shafer theory, grey theory, Monte Carlo 
simulation, Bayesian Networks (BNs), Markov models and artificial neural networks have 
contributed to enriching the literature by overcoming glitches inherent in the traditional 
FMEA and at the same time enhancing the performance of FMEA, especially when 
criticality analysis is conducted (Yang et al., 2008). Moreover, although contributing to the 
development of more precise failure criticality analysis, such new methods still render 
themselves vulnerable by losing advances of the conventional FMEA method, visibility, 
and easiness. 
 
Yang et al. (2008) proposed a hybrid Fuzzy Rule-based Bayesian Reasoning (FuRBaR) 
methodology to delineate the role of Bayesian Reasoning in fuzzy rule based risk inference 
in a complementary way. It uses the Bayesian marginalization rule to accommodate all 
relevant IF-THEN rules with belief structures and calculates failure priority values in 
posterior probabilities, while a fuzzy rule base (FRB) is employed as an effective way to 
elicit expert judgments for rationalizing the configuration of subjective probabilities. 
Although showing much attractiveness, it still has a significant applicable problem, which 
is associated with the establishment of FRB with a rational structure of degrees of belief 
(DoB2).  
 
This paper aims to develop an advanced safety analysis approach through incorporating 
Fuzzy Rule-Based Bayesian Networks (FRBN) to evaluate the criticality of the hazardous 
events in a container terminal. The new method rationalizes the DoB distribution and 
develops a new risk based decision support tool for effective seaport risk evaluation. To 
achieve the aim, this paper is organized as follows. An analytical overview of FMEA 
particularly concerning its application in port risk analysis is carried out in Section 2. 
Section 3 describes the novel FMEA framework capable of incorporating different weights 
of risk parameters into FRB. A real case study regarding container terminal safety 
evaluation is investigated to demonstrate the feasibility of the new methodology in Section 
4. Section 5 concludes the paper. Consequently, this study makes a contribution to 
facilitating FMEA applications and enhancing container terminals’ safety management. 
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2. Literature review 
Safety of seaports is playing an increasingly important role in ensuring port operations, 
thus attracting much risk related research from operational, organizational and economic 
perspectives (Legato and Monaco, 2004; Marlow and Casaca, 2003; Trbojevic and Carr, 
2000; Fabiano et al. 2010; Mokhtari et al., 2011; Soares and Teixeira, 2001). A review by 
Pallis et al. (2010) on 395 port-related journal papers published between 1997 and 2008 
discloses that, despite the criticality of safety and security in efficient supply chains and 
international trade, risk analysis persistently occupied a backseat role within port research 
being overwhelmed by other aspects involving efficiency analysis, port competition, 
geographical analysis and spatial evolution, port policy and governance, to name but a few 
(Yang et al., 2014).  
 
FMEA is one of the most widely applied hazard identification and risk analysis methods 
due to its visibility and easiness (Braglia et al., 2003). The traditional FMEA method has 
three fundamental attributes, namely failure occurrence likelihood (L), consequence 
severity (C), and probability of failures being undetected (P), which are employed to 
assess the safety level of each failure mode and to calculate their risk priority numbers 
(RPN) (Yang et al., 2008). The classical RPN approach suffered from some critical 
drawbacks such as insufficient  quantifying of the effectiveness of corrective/preventive 
action and an inability to consider  other risk parameters apart from L, C and P and their 
associated weights (Yang et al., 2008). Furthermore, it dealt only with numerical 
evaluation that can be inaccurate and also  difficult in   assigning intangible quantities 
(Braglia et al., 2003). The method has, therefore, incorporated advanced uncertainty 
modelling techniques such as fuzzy sets (Zadeh, 1965), grey theory (Deng, 1989), 
evidential reasoning (Yang, 2001) and BNs (Jenson, 2001) to facilitate its practical 
applications in maritime and offshore engineering safety (Sii et al., 2001), system 
reliability and failure mode analysis (Braglia et al., 2003), engineering system safety (Liu 
et al., 2005) and maritime and port security (Yang et al., 2009). Among the quantitative 
development of FMEA, a FuRBaR approach was proposed by using a Bayesian reasoning 
mechanism to conduct FRB risk inference in order to achieve sensitive failure priority 
values without compromising the simplification of the traditional RPN approach.  
 
Compared to the RPN approach, FuRBaR uses domain expert knowledge to develop FRB 
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with a structure of DoB and to establish the connections between the three risk parameters 
L, C and P. For example,  
IF L is very low, C is negligible and P is highly unlikely THEN the safety level is good with 
a 100% DoB. 
IF L is very low, C is negligible and P is unlikely THEN the safety level is good with 91% 
DoB and average with a 9% DoB.   
 
While FuRBaR facilitates risk studies, it still exposes some problems when being applied 
in port safety practice on how to rationalize the distribution of DoBs in the THEN part of 
FRB. It needs to be appropriately addressed in order to stimulate the implementation of 
FuRBaR in real safety critical systems. This work will make contributions to the 
establishment of a new mechanism for rational DoB distributions in FuRBaR in theory 
(Section 3) and the development of a new risk based decision tool for effective seaport risk 
evaluation in practice (Section 4). 
 
3. Methodology of modelling container terminal risk evaluation  
Due to the lack of objective failure data, a subjective knowledge based fuzzy IF-THEN 
rule base approach is proposed to model Container Terminal Risk Evaluation (CTRE). A 
rule-based method consists of IF-THEN rules and an interpreter controlling the application 
of the rules. Risk analysis in FMEA is described as the relationship between risk 
parameters in the IF part and risk levels in the THEN part. These IF-THEN rule statements 
are used to formulate the conditional statements comprising the complete knowledge base.  
 
The steps for developing novel FMEA analysis for modelling CTRE based on the 
proposed FRBN approach are outlined as follows: 
1. Establish a FRB with belief structure in FMEA for CTRE. 
2. Identify HEs (failure modes) in container terminals. 
3. Prioritise the HEs using the new approach with rational distribution of DoBs in 
FRB. 
4. Validation by using sensitivity analysis techniques. 
 
3.1 Establishment of a FRB with belief structure in FMEA for CTRE 
In traditional FMEA, three risk parameters, L, C and P, are used to evaluate the safety 
level of each failure mode. However, when conducting CTRE, the impact (I) of a failure to 
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the resilience of port operational systems is crucial, thus being taken into account in this 
study. Consequently, the four risk parameters (L, C, P and I) are constructed to form the IF 
part while the risk level (R) of failures is presented in the THEN part in a FRB. To 
facilitate subjective data collection, a set of linguistic grades of High, Medium, and Low is 
employed to describe L, C, P, I and R (Tah and Carr, 2000; Wang et al., 2008). The 
degrees of the parameters estimated for each HE are based on knowledge accumulated 
from past events and their definitions are presented in Table 1 taking into account domain 
experts’ judgements3.  
 
Table 1. The linguistic grades for each HE 
 
Parameter Linguistic Grades Definition 
HE occurrence probability 
 
                       (L) 
High (H) 
 Occurs more than once per month 
Medium (M) 
 Occurs once per quarter 
Low (L) 
 Occurs less than once per year 
HE consequences/ severity 
 
                      (C)  
 
High (H) 
 
Death or permanent total disability; 
loss/damage of major facilities; 
severe environmental damage 
Medium (M) 
 
Minor injury; minor incapability of 
systems, equipment or facilities 
that disrupts operations over 3 
hours; minor damage to the 
environment. 
Low (L) 
 
Minor medical treatment; slight 
equipment or system damage but 
fully functional and serviceable; 
little or no environment damage. 
 
 
 
probability of HE being 
undetected 
 
High (H) 
 
Impossible or difficult to be detected 
through intensive or regular checks 
or maintenance 
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  7 
                       (P) Medium (M) 
 
Possible to be detected through 
intensive checks or maintenance 
Low (L) 
 
Possible to be detected through 
regular checks or maintenance 
HE impact on the resilience of 
port operational systems 
 
                       (I) 
 
High (H) 
 
Loss of ability to accomplish the 
operations or operation failure in 
the port 
Medium (M) 
 
Degraded operations capability or 
readiness of the port 
Low (L) 
Little or no adverse impact on 
operations capability of the port 
 
 
A belief structure is introduced to model the THEN part in a FRB. For example,   
 
 Rule 1: If L is Low, C is Low, P is Low and I is Low, then R is Low with a 100% 
DoB, Medium with a 0% DoB and High with a 0% DoB. 
 Rule 2: If L is Low, C is Low, P is Low and I is Medium, then R is Low with a 75% 
DoB, Medium with a 25% DoB and High with a 0% DoB. 
 Rule 3: If L is Low, C is Low, P is Low and I is High, then R is Low with a 75% 
DoB, Medium with a 0% DoB and High with a 25% DoB. 
 
It can be seen from the above three rules that a proportion method is used to rationalise the 
DoB distribution. Specifically speaking, the DoB belonging to a particular grade in the 
THEN part is calculated by dividing the number of the risk parameters, which receive the 
same grade in the IF part, by four. For instance, in Rule 1, the number of the risk 
parameters receiving the Low grade in the IF part is four. The DoB belonging to Low in 
the THEN part is therefore computed as 100% (4/4 = 100%). In Rule 2, the numbers of the 
risk parameters receiving the Low and Medium grades in the IF part are three and one, 
respectively. The DoBs belonging to Low and Medium in the THEN part are therefore 75% 
(3/4 = 75%) and 25% (1/4 = 25%) respectively. In a similar way, the FRB used in CTRE 
containing 81 rules (3×3×3×3) with a rational DoB distribution is obtained and presented 
in Table 2.  
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Table 2. The established FRB with a belief structure for CTRE 
 
Rules Four risk parameters in the IF part DoB in the THEN part 
No (L) (C) (P) (I) 
Low 
(R1) 
Medium 
(R2) 
High 
(R3) 
1.  
Low (L1) Low (C1) Low (P1) Low (I1) 1 
  
2.  
Low (L1) Low (C1) Low (P1) Medium (I2)  0.75 0.25 
 
3.  
Low (L1) Low (C1) Low (P1) High (I3) 0.75 
 
0.25 
4.  
Low (L1) Medium (C2) Low (P1) Low (I1) 0.75 0.25 
 
5.  
Low (L1) Medium (C2) Low (P1) Medium (I2) 0.50 0.50 
 … … … … … … … … 
77.  
High (L3) Medium (C2) High (P3) Medium (I2) 
 
0.50 0.50 
78.  
High (L3) Medium (C2) High (P3) High (I3) 
 
0.25 0.75 
79.  
High (L3) High (C3) High (P3) Low (I1) 0.25 
 
0.75 
80.  
High (L3) High (C3) High (P3) Medium (I2) 
 
0.25 0.75 
81.  
High (L3) High (C3) High (P3) High (I3) 
  
1 
 
3.2 Identification of the hazardous events (failure modes) in container terminals 
Container terminals are often described as open systems of container flows within a 
quayside for cargo loading and unloading and a landside where containers are moved 
from/to trucks and/or trains. A stacking area for storing containers normally between the 
quayside and landside is equipped with various facilities for the decoupling of the 
quayside and landside operations. The hazardous events investigated in this study are 
those that occurred within the container terminal area defined above. The risks associated 
  9 
with the external interfaces of the terminal in the shore side and sea side are not taken into 
account in this study (see Figure 1). 
 
 
Figure 1. Scope of container terminal operations (Al Yami et al., 2013) 
 
In terms of container terminal operations conducted by a large number of workers and 
equipment in a variety of activities at different sites, safety issues are of significant 
importance. In respect of the container terminal operational safety, the performance of 
different container terminals can be determined by different elements that are continuously 
taking into account a range of internal and external factors influencing the productivity of  
the system (Legato and Monaco, 2004). 
 
Moreover, the application of operational safety practice and qualified duty holders is 
essential. It was addressed by the UK Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA, previously 
known as Marine Safety Agency (MSA)) through  Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) to the 
International Maritime Organization (IMO) for the purposes of improving the safety of 
and pollution prevention within ports (Trbojevic and Carr, 2000). However, currently 
there is no evidence that  international safety standards address the safety performance 
within container terminals. Several attempts were made that can be defined as individual 
contributions for safety practice in container terminals. For instance, the Health and Safety 
Executive (HSE) has focused comprehensively on health, safety, and environmental 
related issues for offshore terminal operations, particularly as a result of the inquiry into 
the Piper Alpha disaster that took place in 1988 (Mokhtari et al., 2011).  
 
  10 
In October 2010, the UK HSE with the cooperation of the port industry published the 
Guidance on Safe Design, Construction, Operation, Management, and Maintenance of 
Ports and Terminal Facilities to help workers in container terminals identify relevant risk 
sources in various duties under health and safety legislation. Moreover, the Department of 
Transport in the UK required all marine ports to perform risk assessment of their marine 
operations in order to put into practice a safety management system (DETR, 2009). In 
addition, the International Chamber of Shipping (ICS) and the World Shipping Council 
have developed guidelines for best practices in the industry including the safe transport of 
containers by sea and proposed in a statement to the IMO Maritime Safety Committee, 
that the IMO should establish a universal international regulatory requirement 
emphasising that the marine terminal must weigh export cargo containers (ICS, 2011). 
 
In addition, in May 2012, the Port Equipment Manufacturers Association (PEMA) 
published new industry recommendations on equipment protection and human safety in 
container yards addressing the minimum safety specifications for quay container cranes. 
PEMA’s decision to compile its initial publication regarding safety standards for quay 
cranes was published in June 2011 as a joint initiative with the Through Transport Mutual 
Insurance Association Limited (TT Club) and the International Cargo Handling Co-
ordination Association. It was prompted by the results of the global analysis carried out by 
the TT Club that showed that 34% of asset related insurance claims were directly related 
to quay container cranes (Stiehler, 2012). As a result from all of the aforementioned 
guidelines, codes of conduct or requirements are not yet recognised worldwide in the port 
industry and it is a subject of individuality. 
 
In light of the above, HEs associated with container terminal operations including cargo 
handling equipment and transport facilities were identified through a careful literature 
review (Christou, 1999; Yi et al., 2000; Darbra and Casal, 2004; Shang and Tseng, 2010; 
DETR, 2009; HSE, 2010; Stiehler, 2012), which enables us to identify sources of 
significant hazards in container terminals and provides a good view on possible solutions 
to some hazards. Next, the process of determining the investigated HEs is conducted by 
using a “What-If Analysis” technique (Golfarelli et al., 2006) in a brainstorming meeting 
with domain experts. The preliminary study of determining the investigated HEs took 
place in July 2012 in the UK with seven safety/security officers, port managers and 
scholars. Moreover, in September 2012, another meeting took place in the Kingdom of 
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Saudi Arabia (KSA) with five safety/security officers and port managers  to further study  
the investigated HEs. The experts selected, based on their experience in Table 3, are 
actively working in container terminals and/or researching on container terminals for over 
20 years. 
 
Table 3. Experts’ knowledge and experience 
 
Experts Position Company Working Experience 
1 
Senior operational 
managers 
A leading port 
in the UK 
Involved in port safety 
and operational services  2 
 
3 
 
A professor, Head of 
port management 
studies and Director of 
maritime research 
institute 
 
A university in 
the UK 
Involved in maritime 
safety, port operational 
management and 
container supply chain 
management 
4 
 
A senior lecturer in 
maritime transportation, 
marine engineering and 
qualified chief engineer  
A university in 
the UK 
Involved in maritime 
port/ship operations and 
port safety and security 
management 
5 
 
A senior safety and 
security officer 
A leading port 
in the UK 
Involved in port safety 
and operational services  
6 
 
Senior security officers 
A leading port 
in the UK 
Involved in container 
customs and border 
protection 7 
8 
 
Head of safety 
department  
A leading port 
in the KSA 
Head of safety 
department in several 
container terminals 
worldwide  
9 
 
Deputy safety manager  
A leading port 
in the KSA 
Fleet safety and security 
officer  
10 
 
An assistant terminal 
manager 
A leading port 
in the UAE 
Operations manager in 
UAE and employed as 
vessel planner, and 
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vessel operations 
manager  
11 
 
A harbourmaster and 
qualified master mariner 
A leading port 
in the UAE 
Safety officer in a 
number of container 
terminals worldwide and 
some shipping 
companies  
12 
 
A safety officer 
A leading port 
in the KSA 
Involved in container 
terminal safety 
operations and assigned 
in many leading ports in 
KSA as a safety officer 
  
 
During the meetings, they identified the major threats and impacts posed by 76 risk 
sources and hazard events in container port operations. Consequently, a hierarchy of 24 
significant hazards and the origin of their types for container terminal operations is 
constructed and presented in Figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 2. Hierarchy of 24 significant hazards of container terminal operations 
 
3.3 Prioritization of the HEs using the new approach with rational DoBs in FRB. 
Due to possible uncertainty involved, failure inputs are fed into the FMEA modelling using 
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the defined linguistic grades with DoBs. It means that multiple rules will be employed in 
risk evaluation for a particular HE, requiring an appropriate tool capable of synthesising 
the associated DoBs in the THEN parts of different involved rules. The ability of BN in 
capturing non-linear causal relationships, and modelling DoBs in the THEN part of FRB, 
has been known (Yang et al., 2008). To use BN, the FRB developed in Section 3.1 needs 
firstly to be represented in the form of conditional probabilities. For example, Rule 2 in 
Table 1 can be displayed as follows: 
 
R2: IF Low (L1), Low (C1), Low (P1) and Medium (I2), THEN {(0.75, Low (R1)), (0.25, 
Medium (R2)), (0, High (R3))}. 
 
It can be further expressed in the form of conditional probability as follows: 
Given L1, and C1, P1 and I2, the probability of Rh (h = 1, 2, 3) is (0.75, 0.25, 0) or 
p(Rh|L1, C1, P1, I2) = (0.75, 0.25, 0)                                      (1) 
where “|” symbolizes conditional probability.  
 
 
Using a BN technique, the FRB constructed in FMEA for CTRE can be modelled and 
converted into a five-node converging connection. It includes four parent nodes, NL, NC, NP 
and NI (Nodes L, C, P and I) and one child node NR (Node R). Having transferred the rule 
base into a BN framework, the rule-based risk inference for the failure criticality analysis 
will be simplified as the calculation of the marginal probability of the node NR. To 
marginalize R, the required conditional probability table of NR, p(R|L, C, P, I), can be 
obtained using Table 1 and Eq.(1). It denotes a 3333 table containing values p (Rh|Li, 
Cj, Pk, Il) (h, i, j, k, l = 1, 2, 3). 
 
Port risk analysts can evaluate a HE using their subjective judgments based on real 
observations with respect to the four risk parameters and their associated linguistic grades 
(defined in Table 1). Averaging the DoBs assigned by multiple experts to the linguistic 
grades of each parameter enables the calculation of the prior probabilities p(Li), p(Cj), 
p(Pk) and p(Il) of the four parent nodes, NL, NC, NP and NI. The marginal probability of NR 
can be calculated as  
∑∑ ∑
3
1
3
1
3
1
3
1
)()()()(),,,|()(
   

i j k l
IlpPkpCjpLipIlPkCjLiRhpRhp  (h = 1, 2, 3)      (2)   
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To prioritize the failures, Rh (h = 1, 2, 3) requires the assignment of appropriate utility 
values URh. The utility values can be defined as UR1 = 1, UR2 = 10 and UR3 = 100 (Wang et 
al., 1995; Yang, 2001 and Yang et al., 2008). Then a new Risk Ranking Index value RI can 
be developed as 
∑ )(
3
1

h
RhURhpRI                                                     (3) 
where the larger the value of RI is, the higher the risk level of a HE. 
 
3.4 Validation  
One of the most popular mechanistic validation methods is sensitivity analysis. It is 
conducted to test the accuracy of the belief structures based on subjective judgments. 
Testing the sensitivity in the FRBN method provides an analytical judgment for 𝑅𝐼 or the 
safety index. Parameter sensitivity is usually performed as a series of tests in which the 
modeller sets different parameter values to measure the changes in the model caused by a 
change in the risk parameter (Lucia and Mark, 2001). There are at least two axioms that 
can be used as a mechanism for validating the proposed BN model  (Jones et al., 2010). 
 
Axiom 1. A slight increase/decrease in the prior subjective probabilities of each input node 
should certainly result in the effect of a relative increase/decrease of the posterior 
probability values of the output node. 
 
Axiom 2. The total influence magnitudes of the combination of the probability variations 
from x attributes (evidence) on the values should be always greater than the one from the 
set of x – y (y ∈ x) attributes (sub evidence). 
 
4. A real case study on CTRE 
To demonstrate the feasibility of the proposed method, an anonymous container terminal 
was selected to conduct its CTRE. A questionnaire was designed to collect the failure 
input information from three experienced safety officers/port managers, who are together 
in charge of the safety of the investigated container terminal. The experts selected are 
actively working at the investigated container terminal with over 20 years working 
experience  and their knowledge is described in Table 4. 
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Table 4. Experts’ knowledge and experience on the case study 
 
A 
 
Head of safety 
department  
Worked in safety department in 
several container terminals worldwide 
(e.g. United Kingdom, UAE, and 
KSA) as a safety officer  
B 
 
Deputy safety 
manager  
Worked in safety management in 
several container terminals in KSA, 
UAE and as a fleet safety and security 
officer  
C 
 
Safety officer 
Involved in container terminal safety 
operations as a safety officer in 
several leading ports in Philippines 
and KSA 
 
In the questionnaire, they were requested to evaluate each of the 24 significant HEs in the 
investigated port with respect to the four risk parameters in terms of their associated 
linguistic grades and DoBs.    
 
The feedback received from the three experts are first combined (by conducting an 
average calculation) to produce failure input values for the four risk parameters. The 
averaged (arithmetic mean) failure input will be then used in the new approach (in Section 
3.3) based on the new FRB with rational DoBs (in Section 3.1) to rank the 24 HEs. For 
instance, to evaluate an event of a Collision of a Rail Mounted Gantry crane with a Trailer 
(CRMGT), i.e. HE1, the failure input values of the four risk parameters are obtained and 
calculated, as shown in Table 5. 
 
Table 5. Prior Probabilities of NL, NC, NP and NI when evaluating HE1 (CRMGT) 
Risk 
Parameters 
Experts Combined DoBs/Prior 
Probability A B C 
L 
80% Low 
20% Medium 
0% High 
80% Low 
10% Medium 
10% High  
60% Low 
30% Medium 
10% High 
73.3% Low 
20% Medium 
6.7% High 
C 
80% Low 
15% Medium 
5% High 
70% Low 
15% Medium 
15% High 
65% Low 
25% Medium 
10% High 
71.7% Low, 
18.3% Medium, 
10% High 
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P 
10% Low 
20% Medium 
70% High 
10% Low 
20% Medium 
70% High 
0% Low 
15% Medium 
85% High 
6.7% Low, 
18.3% Medium, 
75% High 
I 
0% Low 
20% Medium 
80% High 
5% Low 
5% Medium 
90% High 
 50% Low 
20% Medium 
30% High 
18.3% Low, 
15% Medium, 
66.7% High 
 
Given Eq (1), the FRB in Table 1 can be converted to obtain p(Rh|Li, Cj, Pk, Il). Once the 
prior probabilities of the five nodes in BN based FMEA are obtained, the risk level of HE1 
(CRMGT) can be calculated by Eq (2) as )(Rhp = {(42.5% Low, 17.9% Medium, 39.6% 
High)}. The result can be explained as the risk level of CRMGT being low with a 42.5% 
DoB, medium with a 17.9% DoB and high with a 39.6% DoB. The calculation can be 
computerized using the HUGIN software (Andersen et al., 1990) which is one of the most 
used software packages to facilitate Bayesian network computation. As shown in Figure 3, 
any risk input with reference to the four risk parameters can trigger a  change in the output 
node, which helps realise the automation of port safety evaluation for instant ranking. Next, 
Eq (3) is used to calculate the RI value of HE1 (CRMGT) as 41.82 (= 42.5% × 1 + 17.9% 
× 10 + 39.6% × 100). Similarly, the RI values of the 24 HEs are obtained and presented in 
Table 6.    
 
 
Figure 3. Risk evaluation of HE1 (CRMGT) using HUGIN software 
 
Table 6. Risk ranking index values of hazardous events (HEs) 
HEs 
Risk Ranking 
Index Values 
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HE1 A collision between a Rail-Mounted Gantry crane and a Trailer 
(CRMGT) 
41.82 
HE2 A collision between a Rubber-Tired Gantry crane and a Trailer 
(CRTGT) 
46.83 
HE3 A collision between Rubber-Tired Gantry crane and a Straddle 
Carriers (SC) (CRTGSC) 
41.09 
HE4 A collision between the Quay Crane and the Ship (CQCS) 
 
74.96 
HE5 A collision between two Quay Cranes (CQC’s) 
 
55.14 
HE6 Crane Breakdown due to human error (CBD) 
 
59.68 
HE7 Moving the Crane Without Raising the Boom of the Gantry crane 
(MCWRBG) 
52.32 
HE8 Leakage/ Emission of Dangerous Goods from a Container (LEDGC) 46.69 
HE9 Ignition Sources from Equipment near Dangerous Goods premises 
(ISEDG) 
41.67 
HE10 Person Falls from height due to being too Near To Unprotected 
Edges (PFNUE) 
31.34 
HE11 Person Falls from height due to Non-Provision / Maintenance of 
safe access between adjacent Cargo bays (PFNMC) 
36.48 
HE12 Person slips, trips and falls whilst working on Surfaces that are Not 
Even (PSNE) 
55.87 
HE13 Person slips, trips and falls whilst working on Surfaces with 
presence of Leaking Cargo. (PSPLC) 
60.22 
HE14 Slips, trips and falls whilst working on Surfaces with presence of 
Water / Ice (PSWI) 
57.52 
HE15 Person slips, trips and falls whilst working on Surfaces with 
presence of Oils. (PSO) 
60.15 
HE16 Person Struck by Falling Objects (PSFO) 
 
44.60 
HE17 Person handling Dangerous Goods in Containers that have Not been 
Declared (PDGCND) 
59.89 
HE18 Person Struck by Quay Crane (PSTQC) 
 
28.32 
HE19 Person Struck by Straddle Carriers (PSTSC) 31.29 
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HE20 Person Struck by Chassis-Based transporters (PSTCB) 
 
31.82 
HE21 Person Struck by Trucks (PSTT) 
 
36.92 
HE22 Person Crushed against a Fixed object and Ship / terminal structure 
(PCFS) 
29.35 
HE23 Person Crushed against a Fixed object and stacked containers and 
suspended Containers (PCFC) 
40.44 
HE24 Person Crushed against a fixed object and closing the twin lift 
container spreaders (PCB) 
18.77 
 
The HEs associated with container terminal operations may vary, depending on the unique 
safety characteristics of an individual container terminal. For the investigated container 
terminal, the new method delivers the result shown in Table 6. The hazardous event of a 
collision between a quay crane and a ship (HE4) is the most significant, followed by HE13 
(person slips, trips and falls whilst working on surfaces with presence of leaking cargo), 
HE15 (person slips, trips and falls whilst working on surfaces with presence of oils), HE17 
(person handling dangerous goods in containers that have not been declared) and HE6 
(breakdown of a crane due to human error). Such a result keeps consistency with the 
safety analysis in the port using traditional methods to a large extent based on the three 
experts’ judgements. 
 
The above numerical case study highlights some meaningful implications. First, compared 
to traditional FMEA, it demonstrates that the combination of fuzzy sets and BNs, provides 
an effective tool to incorporate subjective judgements for characterizing a criticality 
analysis on prioritising failures in FMEA under uncertainty. In addition, it improves both 
the accuracy and visibility of FMEA as well as provides a powerful risk evaluation tool for 
port safety management. Secondly, it contributes to quantifying risk analysis with 
prioritization of HEs in a container port as shown in Table 6. As a result, terminal 
operators are able  to easily update the risk estimation results, facilitating real time safety 
evaluation and dynamic risk-based decision support in container terminals. Thirdly, this 
novel approach helps terminal operators prepare their risk management and resilient 
system analysis considering the features inherent in their terminals. Fourthly, rationalising 
the DoB distribution of FRB by employing the same set of linguistic grades in both IF and 
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THEN parts, the new approach leads terminal operators to simplify the communication 
between risk input and output based on DoBs and enables them to easily put FRBN in 
CTRE into practice. Finally, the approach describes a powerful and transparent safety 
evaluation tool in a scientific manner. It provides a sound basis for port safety managers 
and analysts to optimise the safety resources to the high risks as well as effectively 
evaluate the cost effectiveness of the risk control measures by comparing the reduction of 
risk index values of the hazards with and without the implementation of the measures. It 
will also help develop rational port safety management policy by taking into account 
quantitative risk assessment and cost benefit analysis in the  long term. The proposed 
method can instantly rank the risks of HEs of a container terminal according to the 
stakeholders’ needs so that they can measure, predict, and improve safety and reliability 
performance of their system. 
 
A sensitivity analysis has been carried out to validate the reliability of the developed 
approach. The model with its simulation illustrated in Figure 3 can be verified by 
satisfying the two axioms involved in this process as described in section 3.4. The 
examination of the model is conducted for HE1 CRMGT as follows. 
 
By setting the prior probability value of the node “consequences severity” to be 100% 
“𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ” , the posterior probability value of the output “ 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝐸𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ ” 
increases from 39.60% to 62.1% as shown in Figure 4. Similarly, checking all HEs 
verifies the model with respect to Axiom 1. 
 
 
Figure 4: The evaluation of “RE” given a piece of evidence to “C=100% High” for HE1 
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Given that further change to the node I is set to be “𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ” with a 100% DoB, a further 
increase of the posterior probability value of the output “𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝐸𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ ” 
occurs from 39.60% to 70.43% as shown in Figure 5. 
 
 
Figure 5: The evaluation of “RE” given evidence to “C=100% High” and “R=100% High” 
for HE1 
 
Furthermore, if the node P is also set to be “High” with a 100% DoB, then the posterior 
probability value of the output “Risk Evaluation = High” further increases from 39.60% to 
93.75% as shown in Figure 6. Compared to the results in Figures 4 – 6, it can be seen that 
the DoB belonging to “High” in node R keeps increasing with more risk parameters 
receiving evidence to support “High” risk input. It means that the total influence 
magnitude of the combination of the probability variations from three attributes is always 
greater than the ones of two attributes and one attribute. This is in line with Axiom 2.  
 
 
Figure 6: The evaluation of “RE” given evidence to “C=100% High”, “R=100% High” and 
D=100% High” for HE1 
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5. Conclusion 
System safety analysis often requires the use of domain experts’ knowledge when risk 
records are incomplete. The combination of fuzzy set modelling and BNs, notably FRBN, 
provides an effective tool to incorporate subjective judgements for characterizing a 
criticality analysis on prioritising failures in FMEA under uncertainty. The new 
mechanism proposed to rationalise the DoB distribution of FRB by employing the same 
set of linguistic grades in both IF and THEN parts simplifies the communication between 
risk input and output and facilitates its implementation in CTRE in practice. Compared to 
the conventional FMEA, this paper also shows that the new method is capable of 
presenting sensitive and flexible risk results in real situations by simplifying the 
description of fuzzy failure information, improving both the accuracy and visibility of 
FMEA. More importantly, it provides a powerful risk evaluation tool for port safety 
management. The proposed method highlights its potential in facilitating risk analysis of 
system design and operations in a wide context when being appropriately tailored to study 
other container ports. Managerial, policy implications, natural and political factors can 
also be investigated in a similar way in order to provide a panoramic view on terminal risk 
analysis.  
 
Acknowledgements 
The authors are grateful to independent reviewers who provided useful feedback to bring 
this article to fruition.  This study is partially funded by two EU projects (REFERENCE 
(314836) and ENRICH (612546) Marie Curie IRSES, 2013–2017) and by King Abdul-
Aziz University. 
 
References 
1. AL YAMI H., YANG Z., RAMIN R. BONSALL S. and WANG J. (2013), “A new risk 
analysis approach for container terminal safety evaluation.” International 
Conference on Challenges and Responses of Ports in A Globalised Economy, April 3-5, 
Bangkok, Thailand. 
2. ANDERSEN, S., OLESEN, K.G., JENSEN, F.V. & JENSEN, F. 1990. “HUGIN – a 
shell for building Bayesian belief universes for expert systems.” In: Reading in 
Uncertainty, G. Shafer, and J. Pearl, (eds.), San Francisco: Morgan Kaufmann 
Publishers, 332-337. 
3. BRAGLIA, M., FROSOLINI, M. & MONTANARI, R. 2003. “Fuzzy criticality 
assessment model for failure modes and effects analysis.” International Journal of 
Quality & Reliability Management, 20: 503-524.  
  22 
4. BROOKS, M.R. & CULLINANE, K. (eds.) 2007. “Devolution, Port Governance and 
Port Performance.” Research in Transportation Economics, 17, Oxford: Elsevier. 
5. CHRISTOU, M. 1999. “Analysis and control of major accidents from the 
intermediate temporary storage of dangerous substances in marshalling yards and port 
areas.” Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, 12: 109-119. 
6. DARBRA, R. & CASAL, J. 2004. “Historical analysis of accidents in seaports.” 
Safety Science, 42: 85-98. 
7. DEMIREL, B. CULLINANE, & H. HARALAMBIDES. 2012. “Container Terminal 
Efficiency and Private Sector Participation.” In The Blackwell Companion to 
Maritime Economics, edited by W. K. Talley, 571–598. Oxford: Wiley Blackwell. 
8. DNEG, J. 1989. “Introduction to Grey System Theory.” The Journal of Gray System, 
1, 1-24. 
9. FABIANO, B., CURRÒ, F., REVERBERI, A. & PASTORINO, R. 2010. “Port safety 
and the container revolution: A statistical study on human factor and occupational 
accidents over the long period.” Safety Science, 48: 980-990. 
10. GOLFARELLI, M. & RIZZI, S. 2009. “What-if simulation Modeling in Business 
intelligence.” International Journal of Data Warehousing and Mining. 5(4): 24-43. 
11. GÜNTHER, H. & KIM, K. 2006. “Container terminals and terminal operations”. OR 
Spectrum, 28: 437-445. 
12. HSE. 2001. “Marine risk assessment, Offshore Technology Report 2001/063.”Health 
and Safety Executive , HSE Books, Sudbury, UK. 
13. HSE. 2010. “Safety in Ports (SiP).” [Online]. Available: 
http://www.portskillsandsafety.co.uk/publications/safety_in_ports_sip_guidance_suite
_all_18_documents[Accessed 21 July 2011]. 
14. ICS. 2011. “International Chamber of Shipping. Annual Review 2011.” [Online]. 
Available:  http://www.marisec.org/annualreview.htm.  [Accessed 21 March 2012]. 
15. F.V. Jensen, Bayesian Network and Decision Graphs, Springer-Verlag, NY, USA, 
2001. 
16. LAM, J.S.L. & YAP, W. 2011a. “Container port competition and complementarity in 
supply chain systems: evidence from the Pearl River Delta.”Maritime Economics and 
Logistics, 13(2): 102-120. 
17. LAM, J.S.L. & YAP, W. 2011b. “Dynamics of liner shipping network and port 
connectivity in supply chain systems: analysis on East Asia.” Journal of Transport 
Geography, 19(6): 1272–1281. 
18. LEE, T.W. & CULLINANE, K. (ed.) 2005. World Shipping and Ports. England: 
Palgrave MacMillan. 
19. LEGATO, P. & MONACO, M. 2004. “Human resources management at a marine 
container terminal.” European Journal of Operational Research, 156: 769-781. 
20. LIU, C., JULA, H. & IOANNOU, P. 2002. “Design, simulation, and evaluation of 
automated container terminals.” IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation 
Systems, 3(1): 12-26. 
21. LIU, J., YANG, J.B., WANG, J. & SII, H. 2005. “Engineering system safety analysis 
and synthesis using the fuzzy rule-based evidential reasoning approach.”Quality and 
Reliability Engineering International, 21(4): 387-411. 
22. MABROUKI, C., BENTALEB, F., MOUSRIJ, A. 2014. “A decision support 
methodology for risk management within a port terminal.” Safety Science, 63: 124-
132. 
23. MARLOW, P. & CASACA, C. 2003. “Measuring lean port performance.” 
International Journal of Transport Management, 1(4): 189-202. 
24. MOKHTARI, K., REN, J., ROBERTS, C. & WANG, J. 2011. “Application of a 
  23 
generic bow-tie based risk analysis framework on risk management of sea ports and 
offshore terminals.” Journal of Hazardous Materials, 192: 465-475. 
25. NOTTEBOOM, T. & RODRIGUE, J-P. 2005. “Port regionlaization: towards a new 
phase in port development.” Maritime Policy & Management, 32(3): 297-313. 
26. NOTTEBOOM, T. PALLIS, A. LANGEN, P. PAPACHRISTOU, A. 2013. 
“Advances in port studies: the contribution of 40 years Maritime Policy & 
Management.” Maritime Policy & Management, 40(7), 636-653. 
27. PALLIS, A., VITSOUNIS, T.K. & DE LANGEN, P. 2010. “Port economics, policy, 
and management: review of an emerging research field.” Transport Reviews, 30(1): 
115-161. 
28. SHANG, K.C. & TSENG, W. 2010. “A risk analysis of stevedoring operations in 
seaport container terminals.”Journal of Marine Science and Technology, 18: 201-210. 
29. SII, H., RUXTON, T. & WANG, J. 2001. “A fuzzy-logic-based approach to 
qualitative safety modelling for marine systems.” Reliability Engineering & System 
Safety, 73: 19-34. 
30. SOARES, C. & TEIXEIRA, A. 2001. “Risk assessment in maritime transportation.” 
Reliability Engineering & System Safety, 74: 299-309. 
31. SONG, D-W & LEE, P.T.W. 2009. “Maritime logistics in the global supply 
chain.”International Journal of Logistics: Research and Applications, 12(2): 83-84. 
32. STEENKEN, D., VOB, S., & STAHLBOCK, R. 2004. “Container terminal operation 
and operations research - a classification and literature review.” OR Spectrum, 26: 3-
49. 
33. STIEHLER, S. 2012. “Global container terminal operators forecast: 2012.” Port 
Technology International .54, 7-9. 
34. TAH, J. & CARR, V. 2000. “A proposal for construction project risk assessment 
using fuzzy logic.”Construction Management and Economics, 18(4): 491-500. 
35. TRBOJEVIC, V. & CARR, B. 2000. “Risk based methodology for safety 
improvements in ports.” Journal of Hazardous Materials, 71: 467-480. 
36. VIS, I. & DE KOSTER, R. 2003. “Transshipment of containers at a container 
terminal: An overview.” European Journal of Operational Research, 147: 1-16. 
37. WANG, J. YANG, J. & SEN, P. 1995. “Safety analysis and synthesis using fuzzy set 
modelling and evidential reasoning,” Reliability Engineering& System Safety. 47(3): 
103–118. 
38. WANG, K. NG, A.K.Y., LAM, J.S.L. & FU, X. 2012. “Cooperation or competition? 
Factors and conditions affecting regional port governance in South China.” Maritime 
Economics and Logistics, 14(3): 386-408. 
39. WANG, Y. LIU, J. & ELHAG, T. 2008. “An integrated AHP–DEA methodology for 
bridge risk assessment.” Computers &Industrial Engineering, 54(3): 513-525. 
40. WU, Y. & GOH, M. 2010. “Container port efficiency in emerging and more 
advanced markets.” Transportation Research Part E-Logistics and Transportation 
Review. 46(6), 1030-1042. 
41. YANG, J. 2001. “Rule and utility-based evidential reasoning approach for multi 
attribute decision analysis under uncertainties”. European Journal of Operational 
Research, 131: 31-61. 
42. YANG, Z., BONSALL, S. & WANG, J. 2008. “Fuzzy Rule-Based Bayesian 
Reasoning Approach for Prioritization of Failures in FMEA.” IEEE Transactions on 
Reliability, 57: 517-528. 
43. YANG, Z., BONSALL, S. & WANG, J. 2010. “Facilitating uncertainty treatment in 
the risk assessment of container supply chains.” Journal of Marine Engineering and 
Technology,17: 23-36. 
  24 
44. YANG Z., NG, A.K.Y. & WANG, J. 2014. “A new risk quantification approach in 
port facility security assessment.” Transportation Research Part A: Policy and 
Practice,59: 72-90. 
45. YANG, Z., WANG, J., BONSALL, S. & FANG, Q. 2009. “Use of Fuzzy Evidential 
Reasoning in Maritime Security Assessment.” Risk Analysis, 29(1): 95-120. 
46. YI, D., KIM, S. CHOI, H., PARK, N. & LEE, T. 2000. “Developing a conceptual 
model for sharing container terminal resources: a case study of the Gamman container 
terminal.” Maritime Policy &Management, 27(2): 155-167. 
47. ZADEH, L.A. 1965. “Fuzzy sets.” Information and Control, 8(3): 338-353. 
 
